Introduction
Where there are strong institutions and secure property rights, water markets have long been promoted by economists as one of the most efficient ways to share water (Randall 1981; Vaux and Howitt 1984; Crase et al. 2000; Peterson et al. 2005; Brooks and Harris 2008; Wheeler et al. 2017) . Australia has established the most extended water markets in the world (Grafton et al. 2011 (Grafton et al. , 2016 , especially in the Murray-Darling Basin (MDB), and within this area, markets have increasingly been used as means to reallocate water among irrigation enterprises as well as other consumptive users to the environment (Qureshi et al. 2007; Lee et al. 2009; Quiggin et al. 2010) . The development and adoption of water markets as a key instrument for water reallocation in Australia have played an integral role in water policy implementation (Wittwer and Griffith 2011) ; farm risk management (Brooks and Harris 2008; Connor et al. 2012; Nauges et al. 2015) ; farm and structural adjustment within the irrigation sector (Bjornlund and McKay 1998) ; and off-farm (non-production) income supplementation (Loch et al. 2012) . Despite the importance of water markets in improving efficiency, there has been limited academic analysis of the impact of institutional and policy changes in water markets. Even though a number of well-known market risks and behaviours (such as insider trading) have potentially influenced water market outcomes, the topic has not garnered research attention. The main reason for this lack of investigation is the paucity of water market data (and its time coverage).
Since their early implementation in the 1980s, water markets in the MDB have evolved considerably. Water trade in the Goulburn-Murray Irrigation District (GMID), the current biggest and most active trading zone in the MDB, was initially relatively low (Tural et al. 2005) . Since then, markets have been increasingly adopted by farmers. By the year 2002-2003, more than 60% of all farm businesses had been active on either buying or selling water (Bjornlund 2006) . Trading volumes consistently increased in the following years under the impacts of the Millennium Drought (common time frame of 2002-2003 to 2009-2010) and the progressive reduction of trading restrictions. In the southern MDB, approximately half of all irrigators had made at least one water entitlement trade, whereas 78% had conducted at least one water allocation trade by 2015 (Grafton and Wheeler 2018 . In the GMID, temporary water markets have been found to generate significant efficiency gains (Brooks and Harris 2008) . In addition, water markets in the MDB have become increasingly sophisticated with the emergence of additional market products, such as future contracts and leasing (Bayer and Loch 2017) , evidence of price clustering (Brooks and Harris 2012; Brooks et al. 2013) and improved market information sources from the Australian Bureau of Meteorology (BoM). These findings and developments indicate that water markets are similar to financial markets and are subject to the same market failures. Where there is asymmetrical information, diverse forms of market manipulations potentially affect water markets.
One of the most studied and debated financial market manipulations is insider trading. Insider trading is defined as the illegal trading in securities by individual or firms possessing important non-public information (Meulbroek 1992) . On the one hand, insider trading can undermine participation in a market and decrease liquidity (Leland 1992) , and socially, it is considered unfair if some people lose when other people win from having inside knowledge. On the other hand, it has been argued that insider trading allows for all information to be reflected in a security's price, and overall increases market efficiency as prices start moving quicker than they would have otherwise (Grossman and Stiglitz 1976) . Hence, different countries have different rules with regard to the legality of insider trading (Bhattacharya and Daouk 2002) . In Australia, it is an offence under the Corporations Act 2001 (Commonwealth of Australia 2001, p. 202-220) to trade or communicate inside information.
In the case of Australian temporary water markets, which have been in operation since the early 1980s, a number of authors have reported anecdotal evidence of insider trading occurring (Hancock 2008; NWC 2011; BDO 2014) . The potential for insider trading in Australian water markets arose because traditionally information was available to a number of people regarding important upcoming fortnightly announcements that explicitly change the amount of water available for irrigation. This directly impacts the demand for, and supply of, water in the water market and consequently the equilibrium price for that water (National Water Commission (NWC) 2011).
Two types of water rights are mainly traded in the MDB: water entitlements (or permanent water rights), which are an exclusive access to a share of the water resources within an area, and water allocations (or temporary water rights), which are the actual volume (or allocations) of water assigned to the permanent water access entitlement. Allocations vary depending on water availability and expected inflows, and the reliability of the water entitlements owned. Announcements are made fortnightly regarding the volume of water represented by water allocations, from the start of the water season. The total volume of water announced to be available is called the water allocation level and is expressed as a percentage of the water provided from water entitlements within a given year (Wheeler et al. 2008) .
If water is scarce at the beginning of the season, each fortnight authorities can either announce an increase in water allocations, that is an increase in the size of the pool of available water, or they can announce that water allocations remain unchanged, that is no additional water is made available. In Victoria, water allocation announcements are currently made by the Northern Victoria Resource Manager (NVRM). Allocation announcements change water supply and/or demand: if water allocations increase, farmers receive additional water that they can use for irrigation purposes. This may decrease the need to buy water on the market and therefore decreases water demand overall. Thus, allocation announcements can have major impacts on water price (Wheeler et al. 2008) .
The National Water Commission (2011, p. 72) stated that there was 'a need for all market participants to have equivalent opportunity of access to market-sensitive information and at the same time, to guard against insider trading or other situations in which some traders gain a market advantage by having prior access to allocation decisions'. Hence, water allocation announcements represent a key area where there can be a leak of insider information. Various irrigation organisations over time have put different voluntary codes in place to deal with insider information. For example, in 2007 the irrigation organisation Sunwater introduced a voluntary code of conduct including ring-fencing practices to prevent the leakage of marketsensitive information (BDO 2014) . Officially, insider trading only became illegal after the new trading rules for the MDB Plan (MDBA 2014) were introduced on 1 July 2014.
To date, there has not been a comprehensive study that has investigated whether evidence of insider trading can be detected from water market data, in Australia or around the world, despite legislation having been put in place in part to address the issue. Questioning the occurrence of insider trading on water markets is particularly important, as such markets are less liquid than financial markets. Therefore, water market trades are less diluted and the consequences of insider trading are potentially greater. This study investigates the occurrence of insider trading within Australian water markets in relation to water allocation announcements and any observed price movements, in two key time periods (before and after the 2014 MDB trading rules on insider trading). The findings of this study provide insights for institutional property rights, monitoring and governance for resource markets and for other jurisdictions around the world that are considering implementing water markets.
Literature review

Insider trading and financial markets
As already commented, it is important to note that trading as an insider 1 is not necessarily illegal. In most cases, insiders are allowed to trade on the market. Transactions made by insiders can become illegal if insiders use important, non-public information to inform their trades (Meulbroek 1992) . Before 1990, the issue of insider trading was mostly ignored. In 1998, out of the 103 countries with stock markets, 87 of them had insider trader regulation, although only 38 of them regulated insider trading rules (Bhattacharya and Daouk 2002) .
The potential impacts of insider trading have been widely debated in the financial literature, but there are few empirical analyses due to the absence of reliable data. Studying litigation cases on actual insider trading potentially suffers from selection bias (Bhattacharya and Daouk 2002) . The downside of insider trading includes the fact that it may increase the cost of issuing new shares, as investors demand a premium over the risk-free rate to compensate for the risk of trading with informed traders in the future (Gr egoire and Huang 2008), and decrease market confidence and hence market liquidity (Leland 1992; Fishe and Robe 2004) . From a social equity point of view, insider trading is seen as benefitting insiders and owners of investment projects (e.g. the wealthy and powerful), and harming outside investors and liquidity traders. As a final potential benefit, insider trading might increase real investment as it improves the market incorporation of information and thus reduces risk of investors (Leland 1992) .
Insider trading can impact stock prices, trading volumes or trade count ahead of significant announcements. Kyle (1985) elaborated a theoretical trading model in the presence of private information and found that trade made by informed parties moved stock prices, which was also found by Chakravarty (2001) . As information leakage moves stock prices in the same direction as the announcement (Sinha and Gadarowski 2010) , it is possible to analyse market returns to investigate the existence of insider trading. Some studies therefore use abnormal returns ahead of announcement as potential evidence of insider trading. Based on litigation cases from the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Meulbroek (1992) modelled stock prices in the presence of insider trading and found a mean 3% abnormal return due to insider trading activity ahead of significant announcements. Keown and Pinkerton (1981) analysed abnormal returns ahead of merger announcements. Olmo et al. (2011) used an asset pricing model and developed structural break tests in the intercept in order to detect insider trading activity. They applied it to 250 announcements in the FTSE 350 index and found suspicious breaks for 38 of them. Park and Lee (2010) defined three detection criteria based on parameter characteristics estimated from an autoregressive moving average time-series model of stock returns, and suggested that 19% of major shareholder transactions in the Korean Exchange are based on undisclosed information.
Detection of insider trading in stock markets can therefore be undertaken by analysing abnormal returns related to price movements before major announcements (Keown and Pinkerton 1981; Meulbroek 1992; Park and Lee 2010) . However, interpreting the occurrence of pre-announcement abnormal price movements as insider trading evidence implies that such price movements cannot be caused by other factors than insider trading. Several studies have investigated the link between price movements before major market announcements and insider trading, particularly in the case of corporate takeovers. Keown and Pinkerton (1981) found that half of the price movements related to takeover announcements in their US sample happens before the actual announcement. They interpret it as prima facie evidence of insider trading. A similar point is made by Meulbroek (1992) . Gupta and Misra (1988) analysed a major insider trading scandal attracting considerable public concern around the topic of insider trading. Under the assumption that insider trading behaviour should therefore decrease, price run-ups before and after the scandal were analysed, with no significant differences found. Bernile et al. (2016) found significant evidence of informed trading 30 min before important macro-announcements were made, in a context where information was provided to selected news organisations ahead of the announcements under embargo agreements. They interpreted this result as a sign of information leakage or superior forecasting ability based on public information. Indeed, other public aspects such as media speculation and the friendly or hostile characteristic of the takeover (Jarrell and Poulsen 1989) have consequently been shown to influence pre-announcement price run-ups, which argue for a market anticipation theory (Aspris et al. 2014) . Jensen and Ruback (1983) found that market speculation of industry dynamics can explain pre-announcement price run-ups related to takeovers. Aspris et al. (2014) controlled for different major market announcements for 450 takeover announcements and found that toehold investments and their timing explain a significant part of pre-announcement run-ups. The influence of other public information is also stressed by Gu and Kurov (2018) , who found that public forecasts made by analysts with a superior historical forecasting ability explain a significant part of the pre-announcement price run-ups before major gas inventory announcements. However, as noted by Beny and Seyhun (2012) , public rumours and/or public information sources might be synonymous with insider trading as traders obtaining illegal information are incentivised to spread rumours in the financial press to increase the value of their position. Maug et al. (2008) analysed price run-ups in 48 countries and 18,752 takeover announcements. They found that passing insider trading legislation affects the pre-bid stock price run-ups: these run-ups explain less of the total price movements once insider trading legislation is in place. This would suggest that at least some of the pre-announcement price movements are caused by insider trading practices.
Other influences on water prices
Price and volume determinants of water markets in the MDB have been well documented in the literature, particularly for the GMID. There are a number of main price determinants, including: (i) rainfall which decreases water demand as farmers substitute irrigation water for rainfall, while irrigation water is often acquired through markets (Bjornlund and Rossini 2004; Bjornlund 2006; Wheeler et al. 2012) ; 2 (ii) water allocations or dam storages which represent (or provide a proxy of) the total amount of seasonal water received, where an increase in either negatively impacts water prices, as it increases water supply (Brennan 2006; Wheeler et al. 2008; Loch et al. 2012) ; (iii) irrigation agriculture output prices are usually positive significant drivers of water prices (Brennan 2006; Wheeler et al. 2012 ) through their impact on farm income; (iv) some irrigation commodity input prices where certain inputs can be used as a substitute for water, for example purchasing feed barley instead of using water to grow pasture for dairy farmers or rising electricity prices, can reduce irrigation water demand, especially groundwater pumping; (v) output dryland commodity prices (e.g. cattle for dairy) as a land substitute for irrigation can be a negative driver of water prices; (vi) policy intervention can also positively or negatively impact market prices (Tisdell 2010; Loch et al. 2012) ; and (vii) macroeconomic drivers such as exchange rates and GDP growth (Bjornlund and Rossini 2004) can influence water market prices.
To summarise, detecting abnormal price movements prior to significant market announcements while controlling for other influences is one necessary condition to detect the possibility of insider trading practices in the water market. The following section outlines more water market background and formulates insider trading hypotheses.
Water market background
Water markets have been present in Australia since their early implementation in the 1980s. Following the establishment of a cap on total water extractions in 1995, the National Water Initiative and wide-scale government involvement in the market in the 2000s and the MDB Plan in 2012, markets have become a common tool of water policy management in Australia (Wheeler et al. 2014) . Insider trading in MDB water markets was not officially regulated before 2014. On 1 July 2014, new trading rules for the MDB formally forbid the use of undisclosed information in relation to allocation announcements in the MDB (Murray-Darling Basin Authority (MDBA) 2014).
As discussed previously, fortnightly announcements are made throughout the water year that can either increase the percentage of water allocations attached to particular water entitlements or leave it unchanged. This is of particular importance in periods of water scarcity; in the drought year 2008-2009, many water allocations to high security entitlements in a number of districts started at 0% and only reached up to 35% at the end of the year with many fortnightly announcements during the season keeping the allocation per cent unchanged. At the start of the year, farmers had limited information in regard to what the final water allocation may be, or when it may next increase.
3 When faced with this situation, farmers have a choice to use water allocations from their water entitlements; if this is not enough, within the southern MDB they can enter the water market to buy water (either temporary or permanent) -see Wheeler et al. (2014) for more discussion on the Australian water market. Consequently, changes in water allocations can have a direct impact on the supply and demand of water on the temporary market (Brennan 2006; Loch et al. 2012) . Within the water allocation market, there are sellers of water (usually farmers who are not farming that year or have seasonal surplus water that is not needed) and buyers of water (usually those who do not own any water entitlements or do not have enough water allocations to use at a point in time and need to enter the market to buy seasonal water).
When analysing a whole season, generally an increase in water allocation levels increases water allocation supply offered for sale and decreases demand for water allocations. However, the impact within a season can be different, especially if it is early in the season and the increase in water allocations was much less than expected (increasing demand and reducing supply overall). In general, water allocation demand is stronger in the first half of the season and weaker in the second half of the season when full water allocations are often reached (Wheeler et al. 2008) . Hence, an increase in water allocation increases supply and decreases demand, and the water market price decreases (Loch et al. 2012) .
Therefore, water allocation announcements, especially in times of drought and early in the water season, can have significant impacts on the water market. When analysing the past history of Australian water markets, it is often claimed that disclosure of non-public information about future water allocation announcements has occurred before the official announcement release. Consultations and decisions about water allocation level changes do provide a select number of actors with prior information about future water allocation announcements (National Water Commission (NWC) 2011). However, these claims have been of an anecdotal nature only, with no formal evidence.
In the financial literature, it has been shown that insider trading impacts on stock market prices (Chakravarty 2001) and pushes prices in the same direction as the return surprise due to the announcement (Sinha and Gadarowski 2010) . As water markets are less liquid than stock markets (Crase et al. 2000; Brooks et al. 2009 ), this impact may be even more pronounced as trades by insiders may be less diluted by trades of uninformed traders. If insider trading did occur historically in water markets, it is expected that prices will move ahead of announcement in the same direction as the announcement's impact. Therefore, if insider trading is occurring, we expect to detect a price drop in the days preceding an increase in water allocation levels; hence, we hypothesise the following: H1: A decrease in water allocation prices will be detected in the days before an increase in water allocation level is announced, ceteris paribus.
Another situation that may occur is an announcement is made that water allocations will remain unchanged. Such announcements are less frequent, excluding the cases when water allocations are already at their maximum possible level (100%). In this case, water availability itself does not change but water allocation demand can increase and water allocation supply in the market can decrease as farmers need more water as the season progresses. Therefore, if insider trading is occurring, there may be a price increase in the days preceding an announcement of no change in the allocation level as agents with inside information would purchase water earlier or postpone selling water, in order to avoid or take advantage of an increased price later. We hypothesise the following:
H2: An increase in water allocation prices will be detected in the days before an unchanged water allocation level announcement is made, ceteris paribus.
Both H1 and H2 generally assume that irrigators do not plan ahead within a season and only buy (or sell) water allocations when water is needed (or not needed). This assumption is more likely to hold when it is anticipated to be a normal/wet year, when irrigators perceive a lower level of water scarcity risk and adopt a wait-and-see strategy in water trading. However, these assumptions are not likely to hold in the presence of market expectations. In addition, in the situation of H1, an increase in water allocations results in a physical increase in available water supply, which in turn may reduce water prices. But, in the situation of a no change in water allocation prices, where physical water supply does not change to irrigators, changes in water market prices will be driven significantly by market expectations. Therefore, the same impact of insider trading under this circumstance may be more difficult to detect.
It is also important to note that the occurrence of a price drop (increase) in the days before an announcement increases (or does not change) water allocations does not provide conclusive evidence of the occurrence of insider trading on water markets. If market participants can accurately predict the announcement outcome, an abnormal price movement may still be observed earlier than the announcement date. Although some literature considers the occurrence of unusual price movements (abnormal returns) as evidence of insider trading practices (e.g. Keown and Pinkerton 1981, Meulbroek 1992) , other literature suggests that such price movements can also be related to early and informed market reactions to other public information sources (Gupta and Misra 1988) .
Method
Data and area
This study analyses 9 years of available daily water trade representing 28,983 transactions on the water allocation market for the trading zone 1A Greater Goulburn, from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2017, collected from BoM. The Greater Goulburn trading zone is located in Northern Victoria, along the Goulburn and Loddon rivers and within the Goulburn-Murray Irrigation District (GMID). Although allocation trading was initially low in the area (Tural et al. 2005) , the GMID became the most active trading zone in the southern MDB (Wheeler et al. 2008) . Greater Goulburn is of particular importance in the southern MDB, with evidence of price leadership across trading zones (Brooks and Harris 2014) . Information was also collected on all other drivers of water allocation market prices, such as commodity input and output prices; water storage levels, rainfall, temperature, allocation announcements and percentages and other macroeconomic variables. These variables are included in the model to limit detection of price movements related to changes in price determinants such as rainfall that could bias our results. All data sources and descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix SI: Table SI. The price of a water allocation is particularly sensitive to rainfall and drought circumstances. Historical water prices and total volume traded are presented in Figure 1 .
The early years of our sample include the end of the Millennium Drought. As a result, 2008 and 2009 show substantially high prices. By contrast, prices are considerably lower for 2011 and 2012, due to higher rainfall amounts. Volumes traded on the market also tend to increase after the end of the Millennium Drought. There is a clear seasonal pattern, as volumes traded are lower in July, as irrigators face a higher uncertainty at the start of the water year. This trend is also found if we consider the time period of our data set as a whole, the mean monthly water price increases from July (AUD$127.7/ML) to September (AUD$141.6/ ML), then decreases until the end of a water year in June (AUD$95.5/ML). This pattern supports the statement that farmers tend to hold more water than necessary at the start of the water year (Bjornlund 2003; Brennan 2006; Brooks and Harris 2008) until the uncertainty related to water availability decreases. Therefore, a premium is paid by those buying water early in the water year. This is perceived as an insurance-related premium by farmers (Loch et al. 2012) .
Note that many trades in our database are registered with a price equal to zero. These 'zero-priced' trades represented 37% of the total GMID transactions. There are explanations for this phenomenon. The most common reason for zero-priced trades is where water is transferred between accounts without a valid contract to govern the transfer. This can occur when individuals transfer water between accounts they own, family members transferring between each other, intracompany transfers or the Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder (CEWH) transferring water between accounts (CEWH trades make up the majority of zero-priced trades). Second, zero-priced trades can be trades where price has not been reported. Although the trading rules introduced in 2014 formally require water traders to report prices, there is a lack of enforcement in this matter (albeit the MDBA is currently focusing attention on water price reporting compliance (MDBA 2018)). Motives for not reporting the price include the fact that it is not compulsory and hence just not provided, but it may also include hiding prices from competitors and the desire to remain anonymous. Trades with zero prices were excluded from the database. 
Regression
Insider trading detection methodologies have been largely studied in the case of stock markets (e.g. Meulbroek 1992; Jackson 2007; Park and Lee 2010; or Olmo et al. 2011) . However, there are major differences between stock markets and water allocation markets that need to be considered. First, the dates of water allocation announcements are usually known by market participants. Before the announcement, the unknown part is the allocation outcome (either remain unchanged or increase). Therefore, we cannot use detection methods based on unexpected events, as in Monteiro et al. (2007) or Park and Lee (2010) . Second, trades from insiders are not recorded by any water market authority. Thus, we cannot use insiders' activity on the market as an indicator of interest, as in Beneish and Vargus (2002) . We chose to analyse water allocation price movements in the days preceding water allocation announcements, to investigate the existence of potentially abnormal price movements. Different observation windows have been used in the literature (e.g. Monteiro et al. 2007) ; hence, we chose to study both the 5-day and 3-day time period before official announcements, similar to other literature (e.g. Park and Lee 2010, used a 5-day observation window).
5 Stationarity tests as per Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) (see Appendix SI: Table SII) suggested that the dependent variable and many of the independent variables were not stationary, although their first difference series were. Further co-integration tests suggested there was no co-integration relationship between the dependent variable and any of the nonstationary independent variables. Therefore, the first difference series were used for these variables in the regression models. We defined the first differences of the daily mean water allocation price WP t as:
An analysis of the autocorrelation function and partial autocorrelation function for the first difference of daily mean water allocation price (see Figures SI and SII in Appendix SI) suggests the use of a moving average (MA) specification for lag 1. Using maximum likelihood estimation, we obtain parameters from the following model:
The daily mean water allocation price WP t was regressed on our variables of interest and on a range of control variables. This includes first differences (FD) of: (i) the daily total amount of water traded (Q t ); (ii) total storage in major dams in the northern Victoria area (DamStorage t ); 7 (iii) rainfall (Rfall t ); and (iv) an index of commodity output prices received by irrigators.
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Additional control variables were kept in levels: a dummy denoting drought circumstances (Drought t ); and seasonal indicators (month index MI t and squared month index SMI t ). Our independent variables were also first differenced, with the exception of time indexes and dummies that were kept in levels. Summary statistics and variable description are provided in Appendix SI: Table SI -which also provides details of other variables that were collected and tested (but were not used either due to collinearity or were always insignificant).
Our key variables of interest are the two dummies related to time periods before water allocation level announcements. IncreaseAnn t is a dummy equal to one for each of the five days preceding an announcement that increases water allocations. UnchangedAnn t is a dummy equal to one for each of the five days preceding an announcement that leaves water allocations unchanged.
9 Any statistical significance of IncreaseAnn t (where allocation levels are increased) and/or UnchangedAnn t (where allocation levels are 6 Alternative specifications were used as robustness tests, including a MA(1)-GARCH(1) specification to account for conditional heteroscedasticity. Overall, results were consistent regarding the variables of interest.
7 Current water allocation percentages for high security GMID entitlements were also tested, but due to high collinearity with dam storage, were not used in the final model. 8 A variety of input and output prices were included, with the index of commodity output prices included in the final model. 9 Note that once water allocations reach 100%, the UnchangedAnn t dummy takes the value 0 for the season remainder, as it becomes certain that allocations will remain unchanged. unchanged) parameters will imply that significant abnormal water allocation price movements were detected in the 3-5 days preceding the announcement. As new water trading rules were established on 1 July 2014, we ran three separate regressions: (i) overall (whole time period 2008-2017); (ii) before the new trading rules (before 1 July 2014); and (iii) after the rules were introduced (1 July 2014 to 30 June 2017).
Robustness and sensitivity
All models were conducted with robust standard errors. In addition, different robustness and sensitivity tests were conducted on our results. The residuals were checked to ensure that serial correlation was not present (e.g. see Figure SIII in Appendix SI for autocorrelations of the residual in the main regression). No serious multicollinearity was present (e.g. no VIFs above five or correlation factors above 0.7). We added macroeconomic control variables to check whether interactions between water markets and global market conditions could bias our results. Similar sensitivity tests have been used for ongoing federal buybacks (periods when federal authorities were buying permanent water entitlements on the market to return to non-consumptive use -see Grafton and Wheeler (2018) for further explanation), the percentage of water allocations, major output prices (cheese, milk, feed barley) in the area, and fixed monthly and yearly effects. Results remained robust to different specifications and testing. Table 1 presents the results of the moving average time-series regressions.
Results
Insider trading evidence
This study has tested whether there was evidence for insider trading because of: H1) a decrease in water allocation prices in the 3-day or 5-day period before an increase in water allocation levels was announced, ceteris paribus and/or; H2) an increase in water allocation prices in the 3-day or 5-day time period before an unchanged allocation announcement was made, ceteris paribus. We were also interested in understanding whether these effects were different in the two time periods, namely before 1 July 2014 and after when insider trading was officially regulated, with the expectation that if insider trading was significant enough to be detected, it may be more likely to be detected before rules enforcing knowledge and transfer came into place. In our total time period model (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) (2017) and the time period before regulation on 1 July 2014, the results suggest a significant decrease in water prices 10 in the 5-day and 3-day time period) before an increase in water Note: t statistics in parentheses.
*P < 0.1, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01. allocation level announcement was made. After the new trading rules are introduced, no price drop is detected by IncreaseAnn t whatever observation time period window was used. There was therefore some support for Hypothesis 1 for the whole time period, and particularly before 1 July 2014, the introduction of the new trading rules. In terms of evidence for Hypothesis 2, results in Table 1 depict a significant price increase 3 days before an announcement on unchanged water allocations, but only very weak evidence in the time period after June 2014. No significant price movement was detected for the 5-day observation window. However, note that the dummy UnchangedAnn t is harder to interpret than the dummy IncreaseAnn t . The reason is an increase in water allocations increases available water supply and hence induces a decrease in water prices, while an announcement that leaves water allocation unchanged is dependent on market agents' expectations. If irrigators expected water allocations to increase before the announcement, then water prices may increase. Otherwise, it may remain unchanged. Thus, we find reasonable evidence to support Hypothesis 1 before the new trading rules are introduced, and only very little evidence to support Hypothesis 2 after the trading rules were enforced. It was expected that stronger insider trading evidence would be found primarily in the period before July 2014, with such price movements decreasing or disappearing after 2014, as insider trading practices officially became illegal. Our H2 results are therefore not totally confirming to a prior insider trading expectation.
We suggest that the reason our findings regarding abnormal price movements do not completely confirm insider trading expectations is that there has been a general increase in informed water market trading and rational speculation by water traders over this time period. In July 2014, the new trading rules that entered into application in the Australian water market explicitly forbade the use of privileged information related to allocation announcements to trade on water markets in the MDB. However, we detected very weak statistical evidence of abnormal price movements after 2014 in situations where allocations remain unchanged (and were nowhere near fully allocated which represents a situation where there is more economic incentive to 'guess' the markets). It is therefore highly probable that these detected price movements are caused by rational and accurate speculation, as knowledge about water markets and information has increased considerably. Appendix SII provides additional investigation.
Other price drivers
As all our variables are first differenced, there was a low level of significance for other price determinants. It appears that daily water allocation trade amount has a negative impact on water price before 1 July 2014. This is consistent with the argument that larger trades imply a lower mean price for water because of water's declining marginal value (Colby et al. 1993) , as a higher daily water allocation trade amount also implies a higher trade count. The total storage in major dams located within the area, such as Lake Eildon, has a significant negative impact on water prices, as they denote a higher water supply, that is a higher water allocation level. When more water is made available, water supply increases and prices tend to drop. The ABARES index of commodity prices received by irrigators has a significant, positive impact on water prices after 2014. As expected, higher commodity prices tend to increase irrigation water demand. This effect was not found before 2014. This result may reflect changing irrigation investment, especially the increase in permanent plantings (especially almonds) in the southern MDB in the last few years, which has been driven considerably by higher commodity prices.
Water market allocation prices progressively decrease and stabilise at the end of the water year. This is shown by the respective negative and positive impacts of our month index and squared month index. The alternative use of fixed monthly effects did not alter this result. This seasonal pattern has been previously found, because at the beginning of the water year, there is a high degree of uncertainty regarding the level of water allocations in the following months; higher prices at the beginning of the water year are perceived by farmers as an insurance premium (Wheeler et al. 2008; Loch et al. 2012) .
Summary
Thus, our analysis of water allocation prices suggests that scarcity and seasonal factors are the most important influences of water market price movements. In recent years, movements in irrigation commodity prices have become more important, and this supports the general finding that water market traders are becoming more sophisticated and speculative. Our results suggest that insider trading may have been present before the introduction of insider trading rules in 2014, but only very weak evidence that it may have been present afterwards. Because most announcements can be predicted using public information, it is entirely possible that successful speculation is present in the water market. However, given that not all announcements can be predicted, we cannot rule out the possibility of insider trading persisting to some extent within Australian water markets, although it is clearly currently less than in earlier periods of time.
Conclusion
This study provides the first systematic, comprehensive analysis of the occurrence of insider trading in water markets. Australia provides a valuable case study to investigate the occurrence of insider trading as it has the most developed water markets in the world and high-quality water market trade information. There is also a natural experiment within the data that allowed the presence of insider trading to be explored in different time periods, with water market rules introduced in 2014 that officially regulated insider trading. We analysed daily water allocation price and volume data (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) (2017) to detect abnormal price movements preceding water allocation announcements in the largest and most active trading zone in the MDB, namely the Greater Goulburn. Controlling for known water market influences, evidence of abnormal price movements (in the hypothesised direction) preceding water allocation announcements was found, especially before 2014. There is also some evidence that the new water trading rules introduced in 2014 may have decreased (or eliminated) the incidence of such abnormal price movements, although there is still some very weak evidence of abnormal price movements post-2014. However, it is entirely possible that detected abnormal price movements post-2014 are related to an increase in informed and rationally speculative trading behaviour in general in water markets, rather than insider trading per se. Overall, scarcity and seasonal factors dominate water market price movements.
